Pace University

DigitalCommons@Pace
Case Studies

Lubin School of Business

5-1-1999

Donna Karran International 1996
Lori Bonaparte
Savin Corporation

Robert R. Cangemi
Pace University

Raymond H. Lopez
Pace University

Clairemarie Pierantoni
Citicorp, N.A.

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/business_cases
Recommended Citation
Bonaparte, Lori; Cangemi, Robert R.; Lopez, Raymond H.; and Pierantoni, Clairemarie, "Donna Karran International 1996" (1999).
Case Studies. Paper 2.
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/business_cases/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Lubin School of Business at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Case Studies by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact rracelis@pace.edu.

CASE
STUDIES
No. 24

May 1999

Donna Karan International 1996

by

Lori Bonaparte, MBA
Treasury Operations Manager, Savin Corporation
Robert Cangemi, Ph.D.
Professor of Management
Lubin School of Business
Pace University
Raymond H. Lopez, Ph.D.
Professor of Finance
Lubin School of Business
Pace University
and
Clairemarie Pierantoni, MBA
Financial Controller, Leasing Division,
Citicorp, N.A.

DONNA KARAN INTERNATIONAL 1996

by

Lori Bonaparte, MBA
Robert R. Cangemi, Ph.D.
Raymond H. Lopez, Ph.D.
Clairemarie Pierantoni, MBA

Lori Bonaparte is Manager of Treasury Operations at Savin Corporation. She received her
MBA from Pace University in June 1998.
Robert R. Cangemi is Professor of Management at the Lubin School of Business, Pace
University.
Raymond H. Lopez is Professor of Economics and Finance at the Lubin School of Business,
Pace University.
Clairemarie Pierantoni is Financial Controller for the Leasing Division of Citicorp, N.A.
She received her MBA from Pace University in June 1998.
*Any faculty user of this case in a college or university setting may contact Dr. Raymond
H. Lopez, Department of Finance, Lubin School of Business, Pace University, 1 Martine
Avenue, White Plains, NY 10606-1932, for the solution manual.

_______________________________________________________Donna Karan International

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors gratefully acknowledge Drs. William Welty and Rita Silverman for their
direction, inspiration, and support in sparking our interest in case research and writing. We also
acknowledge the significant contributions of Janet Piccolo, Jackie Womack, and Ana Perreaux
for their editorial and printing assistance.

Background

In a 1992 interview with Business Week, Donna Karan stated "my astrologist sees me
doing something in 1997 that is very, very different from what I'm doing now. It has nothing to
do with fashion. I'm dying to know what it is."1 Ignorance is bliss. In the early months of 1996,
Donna Karan found herself contemplating a major financing decision. The implications of this
decision could produce the event forecasted by her astrologist.

BACKGROUND
Donna Karan had ties to the fashion industry from her early childhood. Her father,
Gabby Faske, was a tailor who died when Donna was three years old. Donna's mother, Helen,
was a showroom model in Manhattan. After high school, Donna attended Parson's School of
Design to further her interest in fashion. She left Parson’s before graduating to join Anne Klein
& Company. After only a few months on the job, she was fired because of her relationship with
a boutique owner, Mark Karan. After marrying Mr. Karan, she was hired once again by Anne
Klein.
Donna quickly became an asset to the Anne Klein organization. Over the next 15 years,
she became a top designer, launching Anne Klein II (a slightly less expensive clothing line) in
1983. She divorced her husband and married Stephan Weiss, a sculptor, in 1983. Takihyo Inc.,
major partners and financial managers of Anne Klein, disagreed with Donna's plans for the
company, so they fired her. However, they urged Donna to open her own company, which she
did in 1985 with $3 million of funding from Takihyo (owned by Messrs. Taki and Mori). From
this humble beginning, Donna Karan built her design company into a major player on Seventh
Avenue.
In 1993, Donna Karan made plans for an initial public offering (IPO) that did not
materialize. Primary motivators for this deal included her desire to diversify into men's and
children's wear, as well as cosmetics. Sources close to the company reported that internal
friction between Takihyo (Messrs. Taki and Mori) and Donna and her husband led to the
disintegration of the IPO. Donna Karan and her Japanese partners could not agree on the amount
of restricted stock Donna would receive from the IPO. In addition, Takihyo wanted Donna
Karan to follow industry norms and license the beauty supply and fragrance division. Donna
Karan and her husband preferred to maintain creative control over the division and therefore kept
it in-house. The company denied these claims and cited that a weakening apparel market and
slower-than-expected sales forced the cancellation of the stock offering. "We don't believe that
our offering would receive a valuation that truly reflects the company's long-term potential for
growth and profitability.”2
Industry analysts cited fundamental issues with the IPO structure itself. For example,
principals in the company would get royalties from the revenue stream. In addition, only 14
percent of the money raised in the IPO would go to fuel the company's future growth; the
remaining 86 percent was to be used to pay off partners and reduce debt. There was also
industry concern over the management team — because Messrs. Mori and Taki would have
smaller roles (they had the expertise of building apparel companies), and Donna Karan and her
husband had limited financial management experience. Mr. Charles Ronson, publisher of the
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IPO Value Monitor, said "Once this turmoil ends, they will presumably be able to present a
unified face to the public and seek to go public again."3
To attain that goal, Donna Karan hired a CFO, David Golden, in mid-March 1994. He
was charged with implementing cost containment policies and ensuring that the bottom line of
the company was such that it could move forward to increase its credit lines and/or succeed in its
private debt placement. Mr. Golden was fired six weeks into his employment, on April 29, 1994.
He charged "...that the financial health of Donna Karan International was significantly worse
than what was perceived by the financial markets." Donna Karan fired back, stating that "Mr.
Golden was negligent in preparing contingency plans needed by Citibank when renewing credit
lines. He put the company in technical default.”4 This all came at a time when DKI was trying to
sell a private placement of debt to decrease its reliance on its expiring short-term line of credit.

THE BUSINESS OF DONNA KARAN INTERNATIONAL
By 1995, Donna Karan International, lnc. was one of the world's leading international
fashion design houses. That same year, the Oprah Winfrey show featured an hour-long program
with Donna Karan and a live fashion show. The program was topped off by a conversation
between Karan and Barbra Streisand who phoned in from an exotic movie location. “Hey,
honey!” Oprah then asked, "OK, Barbara, what's your favorite Donna outfit?” Barbara's
response "Ooh, it’s the dresses she does that hide my fanny!"5 Karan's designs focused on
comfortable, practical yet sensual, hip-slimming clothes that accentuate the positive and
eliminate the negative.
Product Lines
The company designed, contracted for the manufacture of, marketed, and distributed
"designer" and "bridge" collections of men's and women’s clothing, sportswear, accessories and
shoes. Women's apparel was the primary focus of the company. Labels included Donna Karan
New York (the higher-end signature collection) and DKNY (the casual, more moderately
priced collection).
The original Donna Karan New York Collection was based on the concept of seven
easy pieces: bodysuit and tights, dresses, skirts, blouses, jackets, pants, and accessories. When
layered in combinations, these items achieved a varied but consistent high-fashion look. The
Donna Karan New York Collection represented high-fashion apparel, made primarily with
exclusively developed luxury fabrics and designed with an emphasis on comfort and fit.
DKNY was launched in 1989 as a "bridge" collection that consisted of women's apparel
and accessories. It was established as a separate brand name to attract a broader customer base
and to create a distinct and more casual fashion identity at lower prices, while retaining an
association with the Donna Karan New York designer image. This line included jeans,
activewear and classic designs and was based on the seven easy piece concept that complimented
all aspects of a women's lifestyle, including "desk-to-dinner" wear.
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Men's apparel lines, first introduced in 1991, followed the Donna Karan New York and
DKNY genre. Accessories and shoes were sold within the two distinct collections. Children's
wear was launched in late 1995, offered under the DKNY label as DKNY Kids.
DKI's beauty division was established in 1992 to further leverage the strong brand name
and image that the company had developed. The strategy was to provide the consumer with
beauty products consistent with the Donna Karan New York "head to toe" philosophy. This
product line began with fragrances and expanded into bath and body treatments (cleansing
lotions and body creams) for both men and women. However, the beauty division had not
provided a positive contribution to DKI's overall operating profits since its inception. From 1992
through 1995, it incurred cumulative losses of $20.4 million. Ms. Karan believed that to insure
her beauty products were of highest quality and to best manage the brand, the company had to
control all aspects of its beauty division, including product development, package design,
production, and marketing. In contrast, Messrs. Taki and Mori believed that Donna Karan's
foray into beauty supplies should follow the pattern of the industry: licensing the rights out to a
company with marketing and production expertise.6 In addition, a November 29, 1993 Business
Week article cited quality problems and production glitches in the perfume division.

Licensing Agreements/Trademarks
While employed by Anne Klein, Donna Karan saw the negative effect of licensing. "I
came out of Anne Klein, and have seen how a business gets diffused through licensing...I saw
how difficult it was to maintain continuity and quality and consistency and how the message can
get mixed."7 When DKI utilized licensing, licensees met the company's design and quality
standards, while management took an active role in the design, quality control, advertising,
marketing, and distribution of each licensed product. In most cases DKI obtained minimum
sales level and advertising agreements with each licensee. In 1996 Donna Karan had licenses for
hosiery, intimate apparel, eyewear, children's apparel, handkerchiefs and face towels, and design
patterns.
The Donna Karan New York and DKNY trademarks were licensed to DKI through
Gabrielle Studios, a personally owned company of Ms. Karan and her husband, Mr. Weiss.
Terms and conditions stated that each license could be terminated by Gabrielle Studios upon the
occurrence of a change of control of DKI at the senior management level (involuntary). Another
condition of the license was that if Donna Karan was not CEO and chief designer, or chairman of
the board and chief designer (voluntary) then DKI retained the right to use the Donna Karan
New York and DKNY trademarks only in industry segments in which the trademarks were
previously used.

Employees/Board of Directors
In 1996 the company had 1,580 employees (1,410 in the U.S.). Its Board was comprised
primarily of internal DKI employees and equity partners: Donna Karan (chairman, CEO and
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chief designer), Stephan Weiss (vice-chairman and director), Stephen Ruzow (president, COO,
and director), Tomio Taki (director), and Frank Mori (director).
Distribution Channels
Donna Karan International sold its products through a limited number of better
department stores and specialty stores including Bloomingdale's, Macy's, Sak's Fifth Avenue,
Neiman Marcus, Bergdorf Goodman, and Nordstrom. Internationally, the company had freestanding stores and boutiques. In the United States, the only freestanding stores the company
operated were its 37 outlet stores, located in 22 states.
Advertising/Marketing
All worldwide advertising, public relations programs, and marketing programs were
managed on a centralized basis through the company's creative services and public relations
departments located in New York. This ensured a consistent global image for DKI and its
products. DKI advertised principally in print and outdoor media but also used video for point of
purchase displays, as well as mailers, newsletters, and catalogs. In addition, Ms. Karan used
celebrities in her ads. This was possible because of her own celebrity status, but cost the
company millions of dollars.
The company marketed its Donna Karan New York brand name and image through its
“Woman to Woman" newsletter. This newsletter was a dialogue between the company, the
designer, and the consumer. DKI used feedback from the newsletter to improve and focus the
company's marketing program.
Operating Strategies
In order to achieve its current status as one of the world’s leading international fashion
design houses, DKI had implemented a number of operating strategies. The firm built the global
name recognition and distinctive brand image of Donna Karan New York in the exclusive
designer market. For the larger bridge market, they established the DKNY brand.
DKI had established successful designer collections and then leveraged the success of
these collections and the depth of its design talent into the larger bridge market. This approach
was first utilized with the DKNY women’s apparel division. Subsequently, the firm
successfully implemented this approach to the men’s apparel division and the shoe division. The
beauty division was expected to be next in this process of brand leveraging.
Worldwide expansion had been an integral component of the firm’s strategies since its
inception. International sales had been expanding rapidly and the firm was commited to
developing the necessary infrastructure to support these sales. In addition, licensing of freestanding retail stores in international markets should enhance the company’s competitive
position in its industry.
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In order to maintain brand exclusivity, DKI employed coordinated global advertising and
marketing, selective licensing arrangements, and controlled retail distribution. These activities
were managed on a centralized basis through the company’s Creative Services and Public
Relations Departments. To reinforce its exclusive image and appeal, the company sold through a
limited number of stores: better department and large specialty stores such as Bloomingdale’s,
Macy’s, Saks Fifth Avenue, Neiman Marcus, and Nordstrom; and better boutiques catering to
fashion-conscious customers. Consistent with its operating philosophy, DKI had been and would
continue to be selective in pursuing licensing opportunities. The firm had also maintained strict
control over design, quality, advertising, marketing, and distribution in all of its product
licensing arrangements.
Finally, the company offered a “head-to-toe” assortment of complementary luxury
product categories designed to satisfy the lifestyle needs of its customers. Over the last five
years, DKI had expanded its product offerings in the following business segments:
Line

Market Segment

Donna Karan New York Essentials
DKNY Essentials
Donna Karan New York Signature
DKNY Jeans and Petite
Donna Karan New York Beauty Products
DK Men Beauty Products
DKNY Shoes
DKNY Shoes

Women
Women
Men
Women
Women
Men
Women
Men

Each of these strategic initiatives expanded and extended the firm’s product lines, as well as
contributing to strengthening of the brand in consumer markets.
Growth Strategies
The company’s goals have been and continue to be the leveraging of its strong brand
name and image in the consumer marketplace. It has expanded its product offerings and
increased its presence in domestic and international markets.
In order to support these goals, DKI has identified a number of strategies. One of these
initiatives is to selectively increase the “number of doors” through which its more recently
introduced products will be sold, both domestically and internationally. More specifically, the
firm planned to approximately double the 1995 sales level of its DKNY men’s wear business in
1996.
In international markets, DKI planned to open 10 free-standing retail stores in 1996. In
addition, the firm was considering the opening of full-price, free-standing retail stores by or in
arrangements with third parties in select locations in the United States.
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Product segmentation and expansion were expected to provide greater “head-to-toe”
assortments to better satisfy the lifestyle needs of existing customers, as well as to appeal to new
customers. Over the next two years, the following areas had been identified for expansion:
Line

Market Segment

Donna Karan New York Fragrance Line
Donna Karan New York Casual Sportswear
DKNY Activewear
Donna Karan New York - expand the Essentials
collection under a new Signature label

Women
Men
Women
Women

The company had plans to target broader market segments at lower price points than its
apparel products. This would include marketing additional luxury products in categories such as
beauty and accessories.
Since DKI brands had successfully been established worldwide, the firm planned to
expand its licensing efforts through the selective granting of new product licenses. Some areas
targeted for this initiative included jeanswear and related apparel, swimwear, DKNY
underwear, watches, and home furnishings.
Characteristics of Publicly-Owned Competitors
The fashion industry has always been and is expected to continue to be extremely
competitive. DKI competed with numerous designers and manufacturers of apparel and
accessory products, both domestic and foreign. Although no one firm enjoyed a significant
percentage of total industry sales, some were significantly larger and had substantially greater
resources than DKI. In addition, with appropriate financial support, talented designers could
evolve into competitors within several years of establishing a new label.
Three publicly held firms have been identified as having similar size and competitive
position to DKI: Liz Claiborne, Inc.; Polo Ralph Lauren Corporation; and Jones Apparel Group,
Inc. Their business characteristics are described below.
Product Lines
Liz Claiborne had three major product areas. The first, LIZ CLAIBORNE, included
professional career wear with desk to dinner versatility, and the accessories group, which
featured handbags and jewelry. Also encompassed in this segment was the LIZ NIGHT label,
which featured special occasion dresses. The second category was the menswear division, which
offered men's business and casual wear, sportswear, and furnishings under the CLAIBORNE
brand name. Lastly, the cosmetics division offered fragrance and bath and body care products
under the LIZ CLAIBORNE and CLAIBORNE FOR MEN trademarks.
Polo Ralph Lauren Corporation consisted of four integrated operations: Wholesale, Home
Collection, Direct Retail, and Licensing Alliances. The Wholesale Division was broken up into
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two categories: Polo Ralph Lauren Menswear and Polo Ralph Lauren Womenswear. The
Womenswear segment included, but was not limited to, Ralph Lauren Collection® and
Collection Classics® and RALPH/Ralph Lauren®. The former expressed the Company's up-tothe-moment fashion vision for women and also played an important strategic role by reinforcing
the Polo Ralph Lauren image of style and high fashion. The latter consisted of classic and
fashion items ranging from career wear to casual weekend apparel. This label was younger in
attitude and lower in price. The Menswear Division included Polo by Ralph Lauren®, Polo
Sport®, Ralph Lauren/Purple Label Collection®, and Polo Golf® brands. Polo Ralph Lauren,
which introduced The Home Collection in 1983, was one of the first major apparel designers to
extend its designer principles and brands to a complete line of home furnishings.
Jones Apparel Group participated in four principal segments of the women's apparel
market: career sportswear, casual sportswear, suits, and dresses. The company's success was
enhanced by its ability to maintain a designer image through marketing its name brands in the
women's “better” market. Its labels included Jones New York®, Evan Picone®, Picone
Evening®, Saville®, and Lauren Ralph Lauren®, which it licensed from the Polo Ralph Lauren
Corporation. The company offered consumers an extensive range of better sportswear geared
primarily for the career woman's working needs. A line of evening dresses under the Picone
Evening® label was launched in 1996.
Licensing Agreements/Trademarks
Each of these three companies used licensing agreements extensively, principally in their
non-core businesses. For example, Liz Claiborne had six licensing agreements for its eyewear
collection, home furnishing products, men's tailored clothing, and women's watches. Polo Ralph
Lauren's strategy was to seek out the premier producer in the field it was licensing. Some of the
product lines it licensed included children's apparel, Home Collection, and fragrance and skin
care products. Jones Apparel Group utilized licensing agreements more extensively than the
other firms in this peer group. Over 35 licensing agreements existed for the Jones New York
brand and 14 agreements were used for the Evan Picone label. These agreements covered men's
clothing, women's intimate apparel, footwear, and accessories.
Board of Directors
In all three cases, the companies in this peer group had boards with a large percentage of
outside directors. These board members had extensive industry experience and made their
knowledge available to their firm’s management teams.
Distribution Channels
Liz Claiborne, Inc. had retail stores and outlets both in the U.S. and abroad (83 outlets in
1996). The Company's wholesale activities were through department stores and specialty and
chain stores. In early 1996, Liz Claiborne introduced Liz Edge and Liz View, in-store
maintenance programs designed to enhance the way the company's products appeared on the
selling floor.
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Polo Ralph Lauren used the "shop within a shop" boutique distribution method in better
department stores. In addition, the company had 67 outlet stores and 28 Polo stores. These
distribution channels were located in the U.S. and overseas.
Jones Apparel Group distributed its products through approximately 1,550 customers,
including department stores, specialty retailer accounts, and direct mail catalog companies
throughout the U.S. and Canada. The company had 196 factory outlets and four full-price stores.
Jones' outlets sold company merchandise, as well as products from its licensees. Jones Apparel
Group used in-house sales specialists to enhance its retail sales in a manner similar to Liz
Claiborne, Inc.
Advertising/Marketing
The fashion industry utilized primarily print ads developed through in-house advertising
and public relations departments for the marketing of its wares. The practice of in-house
development of advertising campaigns ensured consistency across product lines.
INDUSTRY TRENDS
The Fashion Industry
The fashion industry has always been an extremely competitive segment of the much
broader apparel industry. It has its own unique characteristics that determine the ways in which
participating firms compete. Generally, the most important factors that lead to success in the
marketplace for both companies and their head designers are fashion, image, quality, and service
Price does not seem to be a major component of the business strategy of successful firms in this
industry.
It has been said that fashion is about seduction, even though this sounds a bit crass.
Dressing to be sexually seductive is quite obvious, but that is not the main theme for either firms
or designers. Rather, the point being made is that fashion exists to seduce customers into buying
the product.
In contrast, clothing is another matter. Children need clothing as they grow up, and men
and women need clothing for work, leisure, and play time. Fashion is more like the icing on the
cake, the non-essentials that designers seek to make “essential” for those who can and will make
these purchases. These are the garments that are coveted by the consumer, primarily because
they seem irresistible. This is what the designer of fashion must accomplish, in contrast to a
manufacturer of clothing.
The artist creates paintings or sculptures to satisfy an inner drive. Fashion does not
inhabit such an exalted level. The glamour and hype of the industry are focused on a more
practical goal, not only to design, but also to market and sell its creations. When designers forget
these aspects of their profession and simply churn out “the basics,” or make the opposite mistake
of getting caught up and swept away in some farfetched, unrealistic dream, their customers will
not always follow with their interest and their purchases. The successful designer is one who
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balances the elements of design with creative marketing. They will be the ones who generate
value for their companies and themselves over time. Merging function with fashion is a formula
for success.
The fashion industry talks about aspirational apparel — a wardrobe that embodies a way
of life that a customer craves for and “must have.” Most of the major designers follow this
mantra.
The Apparel Industry
Shifts in demographics and changes in consumer buying habits over the last decade
created challenges of a creative and financial nature for the fashion industry. As the baby boom
generation approached their half century mark, they are mobilizing their financial resources for
college tuitions and their own retirement years. Expensive suits and evening wear have felt this
change in buying patterns. In addition, more women in the work force means fewer shopping
trips. Less time to shop results in more targeted trips — shopping “smarter” rather than a
leisurely stroll down the aisles to “see what’s there” — less impulse buying.
Between 1989 and 1995 personal consumer expenditures in the United States increased
by 37 percent. In contrast, the apparel industry experienced a more subdued record. Men’s
apparel sales grew by only 16 percent in this same period, while women’s apparel sales actually
declined by 13 percent, from $84 billion to $73 billion.
In a 1994 survey by Glamour Magazine, 34 percent of its readers had increased their
shopping at off-price stores. Consumers have also been spending less on apparel and clothing as
a percent of their incomes. In 1960 this ratio was 8.1 percent and by 1980 it was down to 6.1
percent. In the 1990s the ratio continued to decline, reaching 5.3 percent in 1993. Contributing
factors were consumers “waiting for price reductions on sale items,” as well as the “relaxed
look” that does not need to be replaced every season.9
The “dressing down” phenomenon has also taken hold in the workplace. Close to 90
percent of American workers dress down at least some of the time. And, in a study supported by
Levi Straus & Company, 7 percent of workers were allowed to “dress casually” every day, in
1992. By 1995, the figure was up to 33 percent and they projected a 75 percent rate in the year
2000.
It seems quite clear that value is replacing fashion as the prime concern of priceconscious consumers. And, the number of price-conscious consumers continues to increase.
Unless some reason for change occurs in the near future, it seems likely that these patterns of
consumption will continue to influence the direction of the apparel industry.
FINANCIAL HISTORY OF DONNA KARAN INTERNATIONAL
The revenues of DKI had grown at a compound average annual rate of 35 percent from
1989 through 1995. While this rate was significantly higher than the overall fashion and apparel
industry, the firm’s sales were growing even faster outside the U.S. In 1995 net revenues in
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Japan, Europe, and the Middle East and other parts of Asia represented 14.1 percent, 12.4
percent and 5.1 percent, respectively, of net revenues (excluding net revenues generated from
outlet stores and licensing). International sales increased from 14.4 percent of net revenues in
1991 to 33.9 percent of net revenues in 1995. Management believed that this trend would
continue over the next few years and, therefore, was continuing to build the infrastructure to
support worldwide demand for the Donna Karan brand.
The company engaged both domestic and foreign contractors for the production of its
products. In fiscal 1995, approximately 47 percent of direct purchases of raw materials, labor,
and finished goods for its apparel, accessories, shoes, and beauty products were produced in
Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and other Asian countries. In contrast, 28 percent were
produced in the United States and 23 percent in Europe.
Although revenues grew rapidly in the 1990s, a turning point for profits was reached in
1993, when the company's expenses ballooned at an even more rapid rate and profits gradually
shrunk. In 1994 inventories were bloated and orders had slipped. Advertising and other media
expenses more than doubled from 1993 to 1994. In 1993 alone, the menswear and cosmetics
divisions lost $20 million. All of these factors put increased pressure on profits.
In 1996 the idea of an IPO for Donna Karan was resurrected. The company was having
difficulty sustaining its growth with internal financing and/or costly short-term debt. Stephen
Ruzow, president, said "the company will try to keep its sales increase to 10 percent so it will not
exceed its ability to finance its growth."10 The company did not adhere to his plan, as net revenue
growth was 21 percent from 1994 to 1995. In 1994, all attempts at a private long-term debt
placement failed, but the company had successfully negotiated a $125,000,000 credit line with
Citibank through 1998, although this cost DKI $1.6 million in up-front fees. Interest was
payable at the bank’s prime rate (currently 8.25%) or, at the option of the company, a fixed
margin (ranging from .5% to .75%) over LIBOR.
Industry analysts speculated on three major forces that led to Donna Karan attempting
another IPO in 1996:
(1) A cash infusion was needed to reduce the high debt levels;
(2) Due to differences in management style and vision for the company, Takihyo wanted
to sever its relationship with DKI. This was a very expensive decision for Donna Karan:
she would lose not only Takihyo’s initial financial investment but would have to repay
the profits they reinvested into the company over the last 10 years. She would also lose
their business expertise; and
(3) Donna and her husband wanted to withdraw their earnings retained by the company
over the past 10 years. The financial markets looked upon the Donna Karan IPO not as a
means of achieving financing for the growth of the company, but as a way for the
partners to cash out of the business. Stephen Weiss, Donna Karan’s husband, said "Look,
if someone comes along with $1 billion to buy this business, I’m out of here."11
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The Financial Environment in 1996
In contrast to the economy of 1993, conditions in early 1996 contributed to much more
optimism concerning the potential success of a Donna Karan IPO. Donna Karan competed
primarily in the luxury retail business segment of the apparel marketplace. These activities were
intrinsically tied to the overall health of the economy. The United States economy had been
growing strongly for almost five years, since the end of the last recession in March of 1991.
In consultation with their lead underwriters, Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., and Bear
Stearns & Co., Inc., management concluded that the time was right to pursue an initial public
offering. This was a time of strong demand on the part of investors for “retail stars.” There
seemed to be an everlasting faith in the selling power of luxury goods. Data below show the
success of recently sold IPO’s of companies in the “luxury retail” market. Since Donna Karan’s
operations were in this category, investor demand was expected to pave the way for a successful
offering.
Stock Market Performance of Luxury Market IPO’s
Name
Gucci
Estee Lauder
Revlon
Saks

IPO Date
Oct. 1995
Nov. 1995
Feb. 1996
May 1996

Offering Price
$22
$26
$24
$25

Stock Price
June 20, 1996
$66.62
$39.88
$28.88
$32.12

Percentage
Gain
+202.8
+ 53.4
+ 20.3
+ 28.5

In the underwriting business, public perceptions as well as company fundamentals may
cause stock prices to soar or plunge. The current market environment for IPO’s had been quite
strong. Almost 600 firms went public in 1995, approaching the record levels of 1984 and 1987
(Exhibit 14). Early in 1996 public estimates showed a record $15 billion worth of IPO’s were
scheduled for the second quarter of that year.
Investors were especially interested in firms with strong “brand names” that were
recognizable worldwide, which would contribute to the success of an IPO in the after-market. In
“brand-conscious” times these names have power and an element of mystique that contribute to
stock market performance.
Another positive aspect of the DKI offering was the potential of spreading the Donna
Karan name to a wider variety of product categories in coming years. On a preliminary basis,
the underwriters estimated a selling price range for DKI shares of $20-$23.
The Offering
On June 27, 1996, Donna Karan planned to offer 10,750,000 shares of common stock to
the public at $24 each and have those shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange. The
proposed disposition of the proceeds was detailed in a New York Times article dated June 29,
1996:
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Number of shares offered
Issue price
Total gross proceeds
Less underwriting fees
Net proceeds realized by DKI

10,750,000
$
24
$258,000,000
$ 15,480,000
$242,520,000

100.0%
6.0%
94.0%

Disposition of Proceeds
Donna Karan/Stephan Weiss
Takihyo Partners
Gabrielle Studios*
Debt paydown
President bonus
General corporate purposes

$
$
$
$
$
$

22.5%
22.5%
2.0%
31.0%
2.0%
14.0%

58,000,000
58,000,000
5,000,000
80,000,000
5,000,000
36,520,000

* Gabrielle Studios was a company Ms. Karan owns personally which licensed the Donna
Karan name to Donna Karan International (DKI).

Donna Karan International's success hinged on implementation of its operating and
growth strategies. The operating strategies centered around the importance of the Donna Karan
brand. They included building a global name and image, brand leveraging, worldwide growth,
maintaining brand exclusivity, and "head to toe" dressing. The growth strategies of the company
were to increase the number of sale locations (including free-standing retail stores), to continue
product segmentation and expansion, to broaden the customer base, and to expand licensing
efforts. In order to implement these strategies, DKI needed funds to finance its growth. In the
past, the company had relied on cash flow from operations, bank lines of credit, and term loans
for its capital requirements. Private debt placement options had been exhausted. Because of the
previously stated growth and operational strategies, the company required a capital infusion to
achieve its goals. Current operations could not support the growth anticipated by the firm.
MANAGEMENT'S CHALLENGE
Donna Karan and her management team faced a major decision point in the life of the
firm. Was this the right time for an IPO? They had tried two years ago and were not successful.
From a business perspective, funds are needed more than ever to carry out the firm’s plans.
The underwriters had discussed the structure of the IPO with DKI management.
Repayment of debt was approximately 33 percent, at the high end of the range of many recent
IPO’s. Fees in the 6 percent range were in line with IPO transactions. However, the more than
50 percent of net proceeds being distributed to owners had raised a number of questions with
potential investors. Under these varied market conditions and potential shareholder concerns,
what is likely to be the acceptance of this IPO initially as well as over time? The day before the
offering was scheduled, the underwriters decided to raise their price range to $23-$25 per share.
This action implied high potential demand for the shares, at least in the short run. However,
longer-term considerations, and the nature of both business and financial markets, also had to be
incorporated into the final decision.
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EXHIBITS

Exhibit 1
Donna Karan International Inc.
Income Statement and Debt Levels
(in thousands)
December 28
1991

January 2
1993

January 2
1994

January 1
1995

December 31
1995

Income Statement
Net Revenues
Cost of Sales

$ 196,570
132,074

$ 259,947
167,638

$ 364,705
234,230

$ 420,164
271,172

$ 510,126
330,689

Gross Profit
Selling, General and Administrative Expenses

$
$

64,496
54,544

$ 92,309
$ 63,933

$ 130,475
$ 102,748

$ 148,992
$ 119,995

$ 179,437
$ 136,906

Operating Income
Other Income (expense)
Equity and Earnings of Affiliate
Interest Expense
Interest Income
Other Expense
Gain on Sale of Interests in Affiliates**

$

9,952

$ 28,376

$ 27,727

$ 28,997

$

(82)
-

(892)
-

(4,063)
(2,980)
-

(8,862)
(2,651)
-

Income Before Income Tax
Provision for Income Tax

$

9,870
2,187

$ 27,484
3,522

$ 20,684
1,312

$ 17,484
1,139

$

56,073
2,398

Net Income

$

7,683

$ 23,962

$ 19,372

$ 16,345

$

53,675

* Other Expense represents costs associated with proposed IPO (1993) and proposed debt offering (1994).
** Gain on sale of affiliate:
In March 1995 Donna Karan International sold 70% of its interest in Donna Karan Japan to a nonaffiliated party.
Source: Donna Karan International Inc. Annual Reports, various years.
.

42,531
2,519
(7,650)
18,673

Exhibit 2
Donna Karan International Inc.
Balance Sheet
(in thousands)
1994

1995

ASSETS
Current Assets
Cash
Accounts Receivable, net of allowances
of $22,507 @ 12/95 and $15,013 @12/94
Inventories
Prepaid Expenses and Other Current Assets
Total Current Assets
Property and Equipment, at Cost-Net
Deposits and Other Non-current Assets
Total Assets

$ 3,728

$ 12,153

49,879
63,606
8,241
$125,454

62,231
85,655
9,946
$ 169,985

24,467
7,083
$157,004

$ 22,505
11,485
203,975

LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY
AND PARTNERS’ CAPITAL
Current Liabilities
Short-term Borrowing Under Revolving
Credit Facility
Accounts Payable
Accrued Expenses and Other Current Liabilities
Current Portion of Long-term Debt
Total Current Liabilities

$ 11,214
29,153
17,374
15,424
73,165

$

Long-term Debt
Total Liabilities

36,002
$109,167

45,779
$123,129

1,146
46,886
(195)
47,837

1,146
79,748
(48)
$ 80,846

$ 157,004

$203,975

53,825
15,766
7,759
77,350

Stockholders’ Equity and Partners’ Capital
Common Stock
Retained Earnings and Partners’ Capital
Cumulative Translation Adjustment
Total Stockholders’ Equity and Partners’ Capital
Total Liabilities and Stockholders’ Equity and Partners’ Capital

Source: Donna Karan International Inc. Annual Reports, various years.

$

Exhibit 3
Donna Karan International

Net Income

Net Revenues

Cash Flow

600

60

60

500

50

50

400

40

40

$MM 300

$MM 30

$MM 30

200

20

20

100

10

10

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

Income from Operations

0

0

0

Depreciation/Amortization

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

Financial Results of the Company, In fiscal years
Source: Donna Karan International Prospectus, June 27, 1996 and The New York Times, June 20, 1994, page D3.

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

Exhibit 4
Donna Karan International
Net Revenue of Company Activities
(in millions)

Business Activity

1995

1994

1993

Donna Karan New YorkR collections for women
(apparel, accessory, shoe collections)

$77

$79

$75

DKNYR collections for women (apparel, accessory,
shoe collections)

271

232

193

Donna Karan New YorkR collections for men
(apparel, accessory, shoe collections)

40

28

18

DKNYR collections for men (apparel, accessory, shoe
collections)

37

18

22

Beauty Products

30

17

8

Outlet Stores and Licensing

55

46

49

510

420

365

TOTALS
Source: Donna Karan International Prospectus, June 27, 1996, page 35.

Exhibit 5
Liz Claiborne, Inc.
Income Statement
(in thousands)
(for the years ended)

Net Revenues
Cost of Sales
Gross Profit
Selling, General and Administrative Expenses
Restructuring Charge
Operating Income
Other Income (expense)
Investment and Other Income, net
Income Before Income Tax
Provision for Income Tax
Net Income

December 31, 1995

December 31, 1994

$ 2,081,630
1,290,929
$ 790,701
600,471
190,230

$2,162,901
1,407,694
$ 755,207
604,421
30,000
$ 120,786

12,884
203,114
76,200
126,914

10,663
$ 131,449
48,600
$ 82,849

$
$

Exhibit 6
Liz Claiborne, Inc.
Balance Sheet
(in thousands)
ASSETS
Current Assets
Cash
Marketable Securities
Accounts Receivable, net of allowances
Inventories
Deferred Income Tax
Other Current Assets
Total Current Assets

December 31, 1995

Property and Equipment, at cost-net
Other Noncurrent Assets
Total Assets

$

54,722
383,128
126,053
393,363
30,235
77,710
$1,065,211
239,467
2 4,565
$1,329,243

LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY
Current Liabilities
Accounts Payable
Accrued Expenses and Other Current Liabilities
Income Tax Payable
Total Current Liabilities

$ 138,000
155,449
12,648
$ 306,897

Long-term Debt
Deferred Income Tax
Commitment and Contingency
Total Liabilities

1,115
7,722
25,283
$ 341,017

Stockholders’ Equity
Common Stock
Paid-in-Capital in excess of Par
Retained Earnings
Cumulative Translation Adjustment
Common Stock in Treasury at cost

$

88,219
35,075
1,255,325
(1,256)
(389,137)

Total Stockholders’ Equity

$ 988,226

Total Liabilities and Stockholders’ Equity

$1,329,243

Exhibit 7
Polo Ralph Lauren Corporation
Income Statement
(in thousands)
(for the years ended)

Net Revenues
Cost of Sales
Gross Profit
Selling, General and Administrative Expenses
Operating Income
Other Income (Expense)
Interest Expense
Equity in Net Loss of Affiliate
Income Before Income Tax
Provision for Income tax
Net Income

March 30, 1996

April 1, 1995

$1,019,873
583,546
$ 436,327
309,207
$ 127,120

$ 846,635
474,999
$ 371,636
261,506
$ 110,130

(16,287)
(1,101)
$ 109,732

(16,450)
(262)
$ 93,418

10,925
$ 98,807

13,244
$ 80,174

Exhibit 8
Polo Ralph Lauren
Balance Sheet
(in thousands)
ASSETS

March 30,1996

Current Assets
Cash & Cash Equivalents
Accounts Receivable Net of Allowance
Inventories
Prepaid Expenses and Other Current Assets
Total Current Assets

$

13,568
144,999
269,113
31,886
$ 459,566

Property and Equipment, at Cost-Net
Investment in and Advances to Affiliate
Other Assets
Total Assets

48,980
21,710
33,417
$ 563,673

LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY
AND PARTNERS’ CAPITAL
Current Liabilities
Notes and Acceptances Payable – Banks
Accounts Payable
Accrued Expenses and Other Liabilities
Current Portion of Long-Term Debt
Total Current Liabilities

$

73,731
74,244
36,982
11,765
$ 196,722

Long-Term Debt
Other Non-Current Liabilities
Subordinated Notes
Total Liabilities

70,149
15,149
44,000
$ 326,020

Net Worth
Partners’ Capital
Cumulative Translation Adjustment
Total Partners’ Capital

237,541
112
$ 237,653

Total Liabilities and Partners’ Capital

$ 563,673

Exhibit 9
Jones Apparel Group, Inc.
Income Statement
(in thousands)
(for the years ended)

Net Revenues
Cost of Sales
Gross Profit
Selling, General and Administrative Expenses
Licensing Income
Operating Income
Other Income (expense)
Investment Income
Interest Expense
Income Before Income tax
Provision for Income tax
Net Income

December 31, 1995

December 31, 1994

$ 776,365
546,413
$ 229,952
139,135
(10,314)
$ 101,131

$ 633,257
438,575
$ 194,682
115,307
(8,487)
$ 87,862

$
$
$

$ 445
(1,908)
99,668
36,183
63,485

$

695
(1,212)
$ 87,345
32,425
$ 54,920

Exhibit 10
Jones Apparel Group, Inc.
Balance Sheet
(in thousands)
ASSETS
December 31, 1995
Current Assets
Cash
Accounts Receivable, Net of Allowances
Inventories
Deferred Taxes
Prepaid Expenses and Other Current Assets
Total Current Assets

$ 16,864
113,230
176,626
12,265
12,480
$331,465

Property and Equipment, at Cost-Net
Intangibles
Deferred Taxes
Other Non Current Assets
Total Assets

36,657
26,585
120
6,132
$400,959

LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS EQUITY
AND PARTNERS' CAPITAL
Current Liabilities
Current Portion of Long-term Debt
Current Portion of Capital Lease Obligations
Accounts Payable
Income Tax Payable
Accrued Expenses and Other Current Liabilities
Total Current Liabilities

$

71
2,256
59,077
2,427
6,781
$ 70,612

Long-term Debt
Obligations under Capital Leases
Total Liabilities

$49
10,102
$ 80,763

Excess of Net Assets Acquired Over Cost

$

Stockholders Equity
Common Stock
Paid-in-Capital in excess of Par
Retained Earnings
Cumulative Translation Adjustment
Treasury Stock
Total Stockholders Equity
Total Liabilities and Stockholders Equity

5,221

$

263
84,172
236,318
(1,140)
(4,638)
$ 314,975
$400,959

Exhibit 11
Donna Karan International
Comparative Data on Peer Group Companies*
Liz Claiborne
1995
1994
Stock Price: High
Stock Price: Low

$
$

Earnings Per Share
Weighted-Avg. Shares Outstanding
Book Value Per Share at Year-End
P/E Ratio High
P/E Ratio Low
Market Value (High)/ Book Value
Market Value(Low)/Book Value

30.00
14.38

26.63
15.38

$
$

$
1.69
75,003,000

$
1.06
78,527,000

$

$

$

13.41

$
$

Jones Apparel Group
1995
1994

12.77

17.88
11.38

17.88
11.00

$

24.00
n/a

$1.20
52,130,000

$
1.04
51,656,000

$

0.91
15,968,000

$

$

$

6.04

$
$

Donna Karan
1995**

4.82

5.06

18
9

25
15

17
9

17
11

26
n/a

2.24
1.07

2.08
1.20

3.29
1.88

3.71
2.28

4.74
n/a

Source: Standard & Poors' Stock Reports, 1997, Donna Karan International Prospectus, June 27, 1996.
* Polo Ralph Lauren data not available for 1994 and 1995. The firm was a partnership.
** DKI information obtained from Predecessor Combined Statement of Income, on a pro-forma basis using the proposed IPO stock price.

Exhibit 12
Personal Consumption Expenditures
(in the United States)

Items
Food & Tobacco
Clothing
Personal Care
Housing
Medical Care
Personal Business
Transportation
Recreation
Education
Other
Total

1996
806
336
76
1,379
913
421
602
431
120
124
5,208

15%
6.5%
1.0%
26%
18%
8%
12%
8%
2%
2%
100%

Source: Survey of Current Business, November 1997, page 29.

1995
784
323
72
1313
872
389
572
403
112
118
4,958

16%
6.5%
1%
26%
18%
8%
12%
8%
2%
2%
100%

1994
762
313
68
1,248
826
370
542
370
105
113
4,717

16%
6.6%
1.0%
26%
18%
8%
11%
8%
2%
2%
100%

Exhibit 13
Donna Karan Product Lines and Major Competitors
DKI Line

Competitors

The Designer Segment

DKI Line

Competitors

The Bridge Market

Donna Karan New York Collection
for women

Armani Borgonuovo
Jil Sander
Escada

Donna Karan New York Essentials
for women

Armani Le Collezion
Calvin Klein
Michael Kors

DKNY Womens Apparel

DKI Line

Competitors

Beauty Divison
CK by Calvin Klein
Polo/Ralph Lauren
Dana Buchman
Ellen Tracy
Emmanuel
Anne Klein II

DKNY Mens Collection

CK by Calvin Klein
Guess
Mondo
Nautica
Polo/Ralph Lauren
Tommy Hilfiger
Versace Classic V2

DKNY Accessories
for women

By Paloma
Coach
Dooney & Bourke
Ferragamo

Donna Karan New York Black Label
for men
Donna Karan New York Signature
for men

Giorgio Armani
Hugo Boss
Calvin Klein
Valantino
Vestimenta
Ermenegildo Zegna

Donna Karan New York Accessories
for women

Prada
Bottega Veneta
Calvin Klein

Donna Karan New York Shoes
for women

Giorgio Armani
Gucci
Prada
Calvin Klein
Robert Clergerie

DKNY Shoes for women

Anne Klein II
Bis (Charles Jourdan)
Freelance
Polo/Ralph Lauren
VS (Via Spiga)

Donna Karan New York Shoes
for men

Dolce & Gabbana
Giorgio Armani
Gucci
Fenestria
Ralph Lauren

DKNY Shoes for men

Cole Haan
Kenneth Cole
Paraboot
Polo/Ralph Lauren

Donna Karan New York
Fragrance for women
DK Men Fragrance and
Grooming Products for men

Chanel
Calvin Klein
Giorgio Armani
Boucheron
Issey Miyake
Tiffany

Exhibit 13
Donna Karan Product Lines and Major Competitors, Continued
Licensed Products
Licensed Marks

Products

Licensee

Donna Karan New York
DKNY

Women’s pantyhose,
knee high stockings,
tights and socks

Hanes Hosiery, a division
of Sara Lee Corp.

Donna Karan New York

Women’s intimate apparel

Wacoal America, Inc.

Donna Karan New York
DKNY

Sunglasses, optical frames,
magnifiers, and eyewear
accessories

The Lantis Corporation

DKNY
DKNY KIDS

Children’s apparel

Albert S.A.

Donna Karan New York
DKNY

Paper patterns and
knitting patterns

Butterick Company, Inc.
(Vogue Patterns)

Source: Donna Karan International Prospectus, June 27, 1996, pp. 44-51.

Exhibit 14
Selected Financial Markets Data

April-96

May-96

June-96

Secondary Market for Bills:
90 days
6 Months

4.95
5.06

5.02
5.12

5.09
5.25

Notes and Bonds:
1 Year
5 Year
10 Year
30 Year

5.54
6.30
6.51
6.79

5.64
6.48
6.74
6.93

5.81
6.69
6.91
7.06

Corporate Bonds
AA
A
BBB
BB

7.68
7.83
7.95
8.47

7.77
7.94
8.08
8.62

7.87
8.02
8.21
8.77

Composite
Long Term
AA
A
BBB

6.94
7.48
8.15
8.63

7.08
7.61
8.24
8.77

7.20
7.76
8.41
8.98

8.25
5.38

8.25
5.42

8.25
5.57

Treasury Rates:

Bonds:

Floating Rates:
Prime Rate
Commercial Paper

Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin
Standard & Poors’ Bond Guide

Exhibit 15
Total Number of Initial Public Offerings (IPO's)
in United States Markets
693
681

700

664

570 575

600
517

494

512

500

365

400

347

351
332

300

200

253

222 209
172

148

140

121

86
100

40
9

61
31 38

5

Source: Securities Data Co.

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

1989

1988

1987

1986

1985

1984

1983

1982

1981

1980

1979

1978

1977

1976

1975

1974

1973

1972

1971

1970

0

Exhibit 16
Total Proceeds of Initial Public Offerings (IPO's)
in United States Markets (in billions)
33.8

35

29.3
30

23.4

25

20

17.7

15

16.7

22.7

16.3

12.4

10
6.1 6.1

6.3
3.1

Source: Securities Data Co.

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

1989

1988

1987

1986

1985

1984

1983

1982

1.2

1.4

1981

1979

1978

1977

1976

1975

0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4

1980

1.8

1974

0.8
1973

1971

0

1970

0.8 1.1

2.2

1972

5

4.5

3.6

